PLEADING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS* THOMAS E. ATKINSON
One approach to pleading problems is by a thorough examination of the methods of handling a single topic such as the statute of limitations, payment or contributory negligence. While conclusions as to one of these may not be conclusive, the results may be suggestive as to procedure generally. With reference to time limitations, as with most other matters, litigants may differ as to the facts, or as to the rules of law, or possibly both. One immediately thinks of two points of possible difference as to the facts, viz., the time when the action accrued and the date of the commencement of suit. Obviously there is no chance for a dispute regarding the method of measuring time. In comparatively few cases will the parties differ as to the date whehi the physical acts, constituting a trespas §, a promise or the like took place.'
There is still less chance for serious disagreement as to the date of the facts constituting commencement of the action, for this is usually a matter of record.
2
Serious factual disputes what the court tells the jury as to the burden of proof. If the court passes on the entire matter, the necessity of instructions as to burden of proof would be avoided and a large number of technical but really non-material errors could be prevented. One of the most usual difficulties with reference to the statute of limitations seems to be merely whether the defendant has taken the proper procedural steps to entitle him to object on the ground of the statute. 11 The reported cases may not be entirely conclusive as to the sort of questions which are ordinarily raised in trial courts, but it is evident that most disputes between the parties with reference to time limitations must be over rules of substantive law and procedure and are not differences of fact. Comparatively seldom is there anything for a jury to decide. In spite of this fact the orthodox plea of the statute of limitations was palpably designed to treat the matter as a proper one for the determination of the jury. All the subtleties of confession and avoidance were thrust upon the plea, with little or no attention to the kind of problems raised at the trial.
Of course, the purely formal and logical attitude cannot be overlooked entirely. In the interest of clarity, it seems desirable to state the facts constituting the cause of action in the declarashown by the plaintiff and upon these he is said to have the burden of proof or risk of non-persuasion. Other elements are said to be mattera of defense and upon these the defendant bears the risk of non-persuasion. Theoretically, the jury or other fact-finding body is supposed to decide a point upon which the evidence is equally balanced against the party who has the burden of proof. As a practical matter the inevitable element of prejudice will overshadow the theoretical rule. Jurors have initial and undisclosed prejudices and also acquire them from trivial incidents during the trial. And remembering that the Colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady are sisters under the skin, the same sort of process goes on in the court's mind. From this standpoint, the burden of proof seems an unimportant and purely theoretical sort of thing, with only a nuisance value. But many cases are reversed because of instructions that the burden of proof is on the wrong party. See cases infra note 11. Of course where there is an absence of proof on a given matter and where the data are difficult or impossible to obtain, the matter of burden of proof becomes very important and virtually decides the case. See Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, 2 1. & W. 894 (Ex. Ch. 1837); Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 (1873). Again the matter of burden of proof may become important if the issue was entirely overlooked at the trial.
"Innumerable cases might be cited. The following are typical in holding that the defense of the statute of limitations must be asserted in some manner by the pleadings or is deemed waived. Brownrigg v. De Frees, 1906 Calif. 534, 238 Pac. 714 (1925 Murphy, 71 Calif. App. 389, 235 Pac. 653 (1925) . See infra notes 88, 89.
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tion or complaint and to raise issue on these facts by denial or to plead specially additional facts which are consistent with those stated by the plaintiff. But too much reliance hasbeen placed upon this so-called logical feature of our pleading. Progress and efficiency are more apt to result from greater emphasis upon framing our procedural rules so that: (1) whenever possible, the disputed points may be settled in advance of trial; (2) ample notice 1 2 may be given to opbonents; (3) the burden of pleading certain sorts of facts may be governed by ideas as to whether those elements should be disfavored.
RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY DEMURRER
When we desire the disposal of a case on an issue of law before trial, we naturally think of the demurrer. It is the one procedural device which the common law had for the accomplishment of this end. Should a declaration, complaint or petition show on its face that the cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations in order to be demurrer-proof? As the writer has elsewhere endeavored to show, the plaintiff is not obliged to state expressly in his declaration that the cause of action accrued within the period allotted by the statute of limitations of 21 James I. 13 Nevertheless the pleader at common law 1 - 4 and also usually under the codes I is obliged to al-
12
The writer has already indicated above that he does not favor abandonment of ultimate fact pleading. Some advocates of pleading reform favor a system of notice pleading which departs radically from present American practices. See Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 IHA.
L. Ruv. 501. Among other difficulties, the extreme notice-pleading system would result in the loss of the benefits of enforced preparation for trial, through the drafting of proper ultimate fact pleadings. Undoubtedly the notice-giving function of pleading is receiving increased emphasis by courts and writers, with a corresponding decrease of attention to the issue-raising function. Yet there is often a failure to comprehend that pleading to a specific issue will give notice, while adequate notice will substantially, though not gramatically, isolate the issue. In general, pleadings should give notice in such a way as to avoid surprise of the opponents at the trial. But it is not necessary or desirable to go to the extreme of stating what the testimony is expected to be. See infra note 120. Often the disclosure of the legal theory upon which the pleader proceeds is sufficient to avoid surprise. See text infra, circa notes 117-123. 1 Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 9, [165] [166] [167] [168] . Because the statute of 21 James I relating to personal actions is the basis of American legislation regarding limitations, the English decisions under it may be regarded virtually as the "common law" upon the subject.
14 STEPHON, PLEADING (Tyler's ed. 1895) 278. This is the traditional statement of the rule. But there is a naturalness in the allegation of dates which would scarcely necessitate a strict rule on the subject. See (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 487, 488. A few common law jurisdictions have followed the cue of Stephen who announces the rule to be a formal one and have declared that unless time is "material" the dates need not be al-lege the dates upon -which the material facts transpired. It would seem that if these dates were truly alleged, it would appear from the plaintiff's pleading whether or not the statute had run. Of course it would be possible for a plaintiff to allege, regardless of truth, a recent date clearly within the period of limitation, but such a practice is dangerous because of the possibility of a continuance '1 at the trial or even a fatal variance between pleadings and proof.-Normally we find the correct date stated by the plaintiff. In such a situation it would be reasonable tq regard a pleading which showed that the action accrued beyond the statutory period, as demurrable on that account. But the English and most American decisions in common law cases and in absence of statutory provisions hold that a demurrer to the declaration does not raise the point of the bar of general statutes of limitations."' Three reasons have been asserted for this position. First, as the date of commencement of the action is not shown upon the face of the pleadings, it is said that the bar does not appear for the purpose of the demurrer. 0 While it is a common statement that "a demurrer searches the record," 20 this does not seem to mean "record" in the sense of the entire judgment roll, but only the pleadings.2 1 A way out of this difficulty has been suggested, viz., by craving oyer of the writ, in which case the writ may be considered for purposes of the demurrer, evidently much the same as in the case of profert and oyer of a sealed instrument. 23 On the whole, most cases have not considered this objection -and the courts are apparently satisfied to learn the date of the commencement of the action from any authentic court documents, whether pleadings or not.
24
The point is a technical one. This appears especially in those jurisdictions where the suit is deemed commenced at the date of the filing of the declaration or complaint. The file-marks on the cover of the pleadings will generally show the date of commencement of suit. It is, indeed, a fine distinction to say that a demurrer will look to the face of the pleadings and not to the official stamping on the back! There is plenty of authority to the effect that a court should take judicial notice of the date of commencement of the instant cause.
28
Another objection which has troubled the courts 27 is the general rule that allegations of time are "immaterial." As the plaintiff is not usually obliged to prove the dates as alleged," the time is not deemed sufficiently established or admitted by the allegation to dispose of the matter upon demurrer. The statement of Stephen 29 to the effect that the pleader may allege any date he pleases is no doubt a contributing factor to this position. The writer believes that Stephen's attitude is an extremely unfortunate one, is not in accord with present notions and is indeed a dangerous one for the pleader himself. true date should be, and indeed generally is, alleged as far as possible. It is perfectly true that the allegation of time is "immaterial" in the sense that proof of a different date than alleged is not usually regarded as a fatal variance. Yet there is no reason why the allegation cannot be regarded as "material" 31 for purposes of demurrer. If a plaintiff alleges a date of accrual of his cause of action beyond the statutory period, it is fair to take him at his word. Many courts so consider the matter.
32
Amendments are now permitted after demurrer is filed 23 and this may prevent any injustice because of a clerical error of the plaintiff's counsel as to the dates. Such amendments might well be limited to meritorious cases where the plaintiff can make a showing to the effect that his right is not barred.: 4 A third objection is that if a demurrer is permitted to raise the question of the bar of the statute, the plaintiff may be robbed of an opportunity to show some exception which prevents the bar from operating35 If the matter is raised by a plea in confession and avoidance, the plaintiff may bring himself within the exception by replication and, of course, prove the necessary facts at the trial. Even in the cases where the defense is raised by merely pleading the general issue or general denial, the plaintiff could be given a chance to prove himself witlin the exception at the trial. But in earlier times at least, there would be no opportunity for the court to consider the matter of exceptions if the defendant could have advantage of the defense of the statute of limitations on demurrer to thie declaration. Some courts have solved the difficulty by requiring the plaintiff to bring himself within his exception in his declaration or complaint if the latter shows the action would otherwise be barred. 0 Under modern practice, the facts necessary to show the exception could be added to the declaration or complaint by amendment either before or after the decision on the demurrer. But the practice of anticipating the defense of the statute in the plaintiff's original or amended pleading would seem strange to a common law pleader. We have come to regard the statute as a defense 37 in both the pleading and proof stages. Although there is no inherent reason why we should not regard the matter of a timely suit as one of the elements of the plaintiff's affirmative case, 38 we seem committed in the main to the opposite policy. While the cases in which exceptions are applicable are not extremely numerous, yet they are frequent enough to be of importance in framing procedural rules. The possibility of the existence of exceptions constitutes the only serious reason for the common law position that the bar of the statute could not be asserted by demurrer.
In early cases, the English Court of Chancery allowed the defense of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer to the bill .
3
There may be several factors which contribute to this holding. Demurrers were borrowed from the common law prac- 38 No one.has yet written quite satisfactorily upon the subject of why burden of proof on particular issues is placed on one party or the other. Thayer regarded the subject as one of particular difficulty. TnAYER, PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 369-375, 388, 389. Some writers have said that a party is obliged to bear the onus upon affirmative facts but not upon negative facts. ODGERS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (8th ed. 1918) 308-310; of. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING (1883) § 108. Wigmore believes that the matter is determined by considerations of fairness and convenience and is also dependent upon the pleadings, Viz., one has the burden of proof upon matters which he must allege according to the ordinary rules of pleading. 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 26, § 2486.
To determine burden of proof by the rules of pleading or by the affirmative or negative nature of facts seems inadequate; manner of pleading should depend on burden of proof rather than vice versa. Atkinson, op. cit 
922
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tice 41 and were not at first distinguished from pleas. Perhaps the seventeenth century chancellors saw in the demurrer a means of disposing of the suit at an early stage and cared little about the common law technicalities of looldng only to the face of the pleadings and of regarding allegations of time as formal or immaterial matters. In addition, the chancery bill, being much more verbose and less standardized -2 than the common law declaration, might be expected to show the facts constituting any exception which prevented the statute from running, if any existed and were necessary to show a timely suit. The complaint would naturally suggest any element which would negative laches.4 3 This fact would probably compel the complainant to state facts which would bring him within the limitation period or within the shorter or further time allowed in the exceptional cases. However, at one time the common law rule against the use of the demurrer to raise the point threatened to prevail in equity. Lord Hardwicke4 and Lord Thurlow 4 declared that a demurrer would not be permitted to raise the point as the complainant would be prevented from replying or amending his bill to show that the case came within an exception to the statute. In a slightly later case -Sir Thomas Plumer, Vice-Chancellor, seemed to be of the opinion that only in the rare case will the bill affirmatively show that the statutory period has elapsed and that none of the exceptions alplied so as to decide the point upon demurrer. But in most of the later cases, in absence of the complainant's showing that the case was within one of the exceptions, the bill was demurrable if the statute had apparently run. 48 Beckford v. Close, decided at the Cockpit in 1784 and evidently unreported. The case was apparently well laIown to the chancellors and the bar for it is referred to in Foster v. Hodgson, supra note 47, Deloraine v. Browne, supra note 45, Hardy v. Reeves, szpra note 47 and Hovenden v. Annesley, svpra note 45. Saunders v. Hord, sapra note 39, decided more than a century before Becdord v. Close, seems to have held that the statute of limitations could be asserted by demurrer.
Lord Redesdale, 49 the rule became firmly established in the chancery practice of England. It is a common statement of textwriters that in equity, the defense of the statute of limitations can be raised by demurrer. 0 In this 'country it is probably the general rule, 51 although there is some dissent.r 2 Another feature of the equity practice is worth noticing. If the complaint did not show the bar of the statute, the point might be raised by plea.
5 3 This is important because the bill might be dismissed without discovery from the defendant as would result if he were compelled to answer." The defendant's contention, if well taken, would dispose of the case at a preliminary stage, Which is a factor usually very desirable to both court and parties.
A fair generalization of the position taken by courts in absence of statute is that a demurrer might raise the point in an equity suit but not in a common law action. In the code jurisdictions there is marked diversity. Some states 15 follow the common law rule and refuse to permit the point to be raised 49 As John Mitford, before his elevation to the bench, he was the losing counsel in Deloraine v. Browne, supra note 45. He faithfully enunciated the doctrine of that case in his text, MITFoRD 
by demurrer. The "Minnesota court = ' has declared that it is impelled by the code to follow the equity rule, which of course permitted the point to be raised by demurrer. Other jurisdictionS5 7 sustain demurrers on the ground that a complaint which shows that the ordinary limitation period has run and does not bring the case within some exception, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The matter is further complicated by special statutory provisions. In several code jurisdictions, the statutes , relating to demurrers expressly mention the bar of the statute of limitations as a ground of demurrer if it appears on the face of the complaint. The effect of such a provision could be whittled away to practically nothing by taking the position that it is only applicable when the complaint shows that none of the exceptions to the statute can possibly apply.-But the courts in these jurisdictions have assumed for purposes of the demurrer that no exception is applicable unless the complaint shows that one exists. 60 the defense of limitations can be raised only by answer. This might be interpreted as merely insisting that the point could not be raised by general denial and not as excluding the possibility of a demurrer when otherwise applicable.02 But the courts of these states generally consider the enactment as a prohibition against the use of the demurrer to raise the defense 3 A distinction has been drawn between the general statutes of limitation and time limitations applicable to special statutory actions. Among the latter, civil actions for death are most common. In these, the commencement of the action within the time specified is generally considered to be a fact which the plaintiff must plead 04 and prove. 04 There is some doubt as to how specifically the plaintiff must allege commencement of the action within the period. It has been held that he must allege the matter in so many words and that it is not sufficient merely to state the date of the accrual of the action under a videlicit. 
a distinction is that in the statutory actions the right as well as the remedy is barred."C The explanation is also offered that these actions are created by the very legislation which contains the limitation while the general statute of limitations applies to the sorts of rights which were recognized at common law.G7 But so far as time limitations are concerned, the operative facts of each transaction, and not the period of time during which sinilar rights have been recognized, would seem to be the important factors. A more plausible reason might be that the special statutory rights of action are disfavored to the extent of burdening the plaintiff with the additional operative fact of a timely suit. This may be sound in the case of some statutory actions, such as possibly those against municipalities. But there seems to be no reason of present social policy which would regard actions for battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or slander with greater favor than actions for wrongful death. About the only really adequate ground for permitting the demurrer to raise the point in the statutory actions while denying it in the common law actions is that in the statutory actions there are usually no exceptions by which a plaintiff might possibly excuse the delay in bringing suit and the exceptions of the general statutes do not ordinarily apply.c" As the only real difficulty in sus- taining a demurrer in the common law actions is absent, most courts sustain demurrers in the statutory actions although they will not do so in ordinary common law or even in equity cases. 0 But some courts have recognized exceptions to the limitations in the statutory actions and on this account have refused to permit the question to be raised by demurrer.
T It is not always clearly recognized that the demurrer serves two distinct functions. The first might be called its disposing function because it is a means of finally determining the controversy. 71 The parties may state the facts so fairly and truthfully that both will agree upon the facts and disagree only as to whether the facts are sufficient in law to constitute a cause of action or a defense. Under such circumstances the decision of the demurrer will finally adjudicate the whole dispute, withGo Of course all jurisdictions which allow the point to be raised by demurrer in ordinary common law actions would permit it here; in addition, the following jurisdictions allow the point to be raised by demurrer in the special statutory actions. DeMartino v. Siemon, 90 Conn. 527, 97 Atl. 765 (1916) 
E. 273 (1920). (foreclosure of mechanic's lien).
71 If the traditional history of the demurrer be true, it would seem that originally all demurrers finally disposed of the controversy. The demurrant was given no opportunity to withdraw his demurrer and the opponent was not permitted to amend; consequently, final judgment resulted from out the necessity of the parties entering into the expense, delay and bitterness of the trial. Indeed, even if the demurrant does not fully agree that the facts alleged by the opponent are true, if the demurrer is sustained and the opponent feels that he cannot consistently with truth state a better case, the demurrer finally disposes of the controversy.
On the other hand, there are many instances in which the demurrer does not and cannot dispose of the entire matter. In the cases in which the pleader omits some items which he should have alleged, or makes his statements in a manner condemned by the law, or states a case which is legally sufficient but which he cannot prove, the demurrer does not determine the merits of the controversy but only the sufficiency or insufficiency of the pleading itself. Most lawyers and judges will recognize that the demurrer performs the latter function much more frequently than it does the disposing function.
7 2 Amendments are freely permitted to-day and a party may remedy his insufficient pleading without substantial penalty/3 The pleader is not precluded from setting up, either in the first instance or by amendment, a formally perfect but false set of facts. The demurrer of course cannot usually74 determine the truth or falsity of the facts and for this reason it usually performs the function of merely securing legally sufficient pleadings. While there must be some procedural devices to secure the observation of rules of pleading,7 5 the demurrer is losing favor and the more flexible motion , is taking its place.
In New York the demurrer is abolished and is supplanted by the motion to dismiss.
77
The motion may be based on objections every decision of the demurrer. If this ever was the law there can be no doubt that comparatively early withdrawals and amendments were sometimes permitted ex gratia; later this came to be the general practice; and now statutes almost universally provide that the parties are absolutely entitled thereto. 
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appearing on the face of the complaint 78 and in this respect is the approximate substitute of the demurrer. However, the motion is given a much broader effect than the demurrer. Rule 107 provides for motions based upon certain objections not appearing on the face of the complaint.7 0 Such motions are supported by affidavits to sustain one or more of the nine grounds of the motion. The sixth ground is "that the cause of action did not accrue within the time limited by law for the commencement of an action thereon." The affidavits in support of the motion can fix the time of the accrual of the cause of action either by a positive reiteration of the allegation in the complaint or by showing that some other date is the true one. The time of commencement of the action can also be shown by affidavit or by reference to some court document, which perhaps could not technically be considered upon demurrer. If there is question concerning whether the time is extended by virtue of some exception, this can be brought forth in the affidavits of the respective parties.
Rule 108 provides that, in the discretion of the court, the matter may be disposed of (1) by the court upon the complaint and affidavits filed by the parties, (2) by submitting the issue to a jury or referee, or (3) by overruling the motion and permitting 78Rule 106. 79As to the proper nomenclature applicable to the various sorts of motions under the present New York practice, see Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 73, at 641. Dicta in some of the cases are to the effect that the allegations of the complaint must be considered true for the purpose of disposal of motions under Rule 107. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 422, 198 N. Y. Supp. 608, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1923 Div. 760, 761, 210 N. Y. Supp. 406, 408 (1st Dept. 1925 ), rev'd, 241 N. Y. 189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925 . These statements would seem to be somewhat misleading. Cf. Camp v. Reeves, 209 App. Div. 488, 494, 205 N. Y. Supp. 259, 264 (1st Dept. 1924 ). There can be no doubt but that a court may base its decisiQn on data supplied by affidavit when the complaint is silent upon the point. In addition it would be reasonable to adopt the version of an affidavit which positively contradicts allegations of a complaint and is not itself contradicted by counter-affidavit. The defense of the statute of limitations can, it seems, be raised in a similar preliminary manner under section 20 of the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915. Koons v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 281 Pa. 270, 126 At. 381 (1924) ; but see Prettyman v. Irwin, 273 Pa. 522, 117 Atl. 195 (1922) . In Michigan the point cannot be raised by motion because the new devise is said to be no broader than the demurrer under the former practice. Vyse v. Richards, supra note 52; Sandusky Grain Co. v. Borden's Milk Co., 214 Mich 306, 183 N. W. 218 (1921) . It is interesting to note that these are equity cases. Formerly, Michigan held that the statute of limitations could in equity be raised by demurrer. Campau v. Chene, supra note 51; see Highstone v. Franks, 93 Mich. 52, 57, 52 N. W. 1015, 1016, 1017 (1892). In this respect the new motion has been given even a narrower effect than the demurrer in the earlier practice in Michigan.
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the objection to be incorporated in the answer and determined at the trial. For the purpose of expedition of the action and the saving of expense, the first alternative is preferred to the others and probably the second to the third. Which alternative vill be chosen by a court will depend largely upon the clearness of the showing or the extent to which the parties agree concerning the facts. If there is serious controversy over them, a court should not dispose of this important matter upon affidavits.r However, if the reported cases are representative, it would seem that most of the cases can be disposed of by the court. More often than not there is no real disagreement between the parties as to the pertinent facts with reference to the period of limitation.
8 ' Often the plaintiff files no counter-affidavits, evidently because he is unable to dispute the defendant's claim. If differences exist as to points of law, these can be determined more advantageously at the motion stage than at the trial as under the former practice. The present New York procedure does not require the plaintiff to follow the practice of anticipating the defense of the statute of limitations by showing his case to be within one of the exceptionsC 2 The whole manner of treatment seems to be a great economy for, if the motion is granted, it or- . 1926) . 82 It will be noted that in the jurisdictions which permit the statute of limitations to be raised on demurrer, the plaintiff will be required to plead his exceptions in his first pleading in order to have it demurrer-proof. See dinarily disposes of the entire controversy, The result is reached sooner and with far less strain on the participants than if raised by answer and determined at trial.
In many types of contractual actions, certain jurisdictions permit summary judgment to be entered for the plaintiff upon the defendant's failure, due opportunity having been given him, to show that there are matters to be litigated. This gives to the plaintiff a remedy for the procrastinating practices of debtors. Defendants should have a similar protection against the nuisance of a pending unwarranted lawsuit. Often defendants, as well as plaintiffs, wish to have the matter disposed of as soon as possible. The constitutionality of Rules 107 and 108 does not seem to have been questioned directly in New York. They surely do not deprive a plaintiff of the constitutional right to trial by jury any more than summary judgment proceedings.2 In cases of real conflict of evidence the court should not decide the case upon affidavit, and by doing so may in a given case violate the Constitution. But a useful procedural device should not be scrapped merely because conceivably it might result in abuses. These two rules seem to be among the most admirable features of the present New York procedure. Under them not only the statute of limitations but the defenses of the statute of frauds, res adjudicata, another action pending, release, incapacity and lack of jurisdiction can be raised and disposed of at an early stage of the case without the necessity of a trial. Indeed many other defenses could well be raised in this way if the rules permitted.
5
The practice is not without ancient precedent, for it is quite similar to the Roman exceptio and to the plea in supra notes 36, 47, 57. At common law such anticipation was not only unnecessary but improper. Gunton v. Hughes, supra note 35.
83 Rothschild, op. cit. supra note 73, at 646, (1924) 85 Possibly payment, validity of contract and the constitutionality of the law upon which the plaintiff bases his right of action could be raised by motion. Probably the question of contributory negligence could not, due to differences between the parties as to the facts in such cases and the closely intermingled question of the defendant's negligence. equity, which was designed to obviate the necessity of an answer with its accompanying discovery.G
The great advantage of the New York motion is that it permits undisputed facts to be used by the comt at an early stage of the case, in order to dispose of the case finally because of the bar of the statute of limitations. To a lesser degree this is true of the demurrer but the court can consider only such facts as are pleaded. Under the New York practice, the plaintiff has ample notice of the defense and of the facts upon which the defendant relies to sustain it. If the point is raised by demurrer, theoretically the plaintiff needs no notice, as only the factual data contained in his own pleading and other documents in the court files will be considered. But it is reasonable to insist that notice of the defendant's legal theory of the demurrer be given because:
(1) the plaintiff may be able to amend consistently with truth and prevent a useless argument and decision upon the demurrer; (2) the plaintiff may be willing to confess judgment without argument as soon as he comprehends the defendant's theory; (3) the plaintiff's counsel should be given an opportunity to investigate the questions of law involved and prepare his argument thereon for the trial court. For these reasons a general demurrer should not be permitted to raise the point. Most jurisdictions which recognize the demurrer as a proper procedural device to raise the statute of limitations insist that it be a special demurrer. 8 7 RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY ANSWER
U-ne? a Denial.
Even under the present procedure in New York it will not always be possible to dispose of the defense of the statute of limitations before the trial stage of the litigation. Furthermore, in the states which more or less generally permit the point to be asserted by demurrer, there will be frequent occasions when a demurrer is not applicable. For example, there will be cases in which the date of accrual of the cause of action is not mentioned at all 8" or in which the plain- 88 See Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa, 838, 169 N. W. 737 (1918) . In jurisdictions which ordinarily allow a demurrer to raise the question (sapra notes 57, 60) when no date of accrual is alleged in the complaint, the point must be raised by answer. Pleasant v. Samuels, 114 Calif. 34, 45 Pac. 998 (1896) ; Pike v. Zadig, 1"71 Calif. 273, 152 Pac. 923 (1915) ; Osborn v. Portsmouth Nat'l Bank, 61 Ohio St. 427, 56 N. E. 197 (1900); Hawkins v. Donnerberg, 40 Or. 97, 66 Pac. 691, 908 (1901) . But if the timely commencement of a statutory action is deemed a condition precedent, the omission to allege the time of accrual may be ground for demurrer. Hartray v. Chicago Rys., supra note 70. See also supra note 64.
tiff alleges a time within the statutory period, which fact the defendant wishes to contest. In these situations, and generally in the jurisdictions which do not permit a demurrer to raise the question, 8 9 the bar of the statute should be asserted by plea or answer.
There are some situations in which a defendant has been permitted to raise the point at the trial under the general issue or general denial. For example, Lord Holt 00 believed that the wording of the general issue in debt, "he does not owe," was so broad that it would permit the defense of the statute of limitations to be raised by merely pleading the general issue, but the prevailing view seems to be to the contrary.W. In penal actions, most courts 92 have permitted the bar to be asserted at the trial after a mere denial of the indebtedness.
This position was originally due to an express statutory provision 3 in England and has been followed in this country regardless of the absence of such a statute. There are a number of miscellaneous situations " in which the statute of limitations has been held to be properly raised at the trial without expressly pleading it.
In the great majority of jurisdictions, a plaintiff who relies upon adverse possession for the statutory period, need not assert the bar of the statute as the source of his "title" but may merely plead generically that he is the owner20
Consequently defendant, who was the initial owner, denies the plaintiff's title by a general or special denial, he can show that the statute of limitations has not run and that the plaintiff has not "title" by adverse possession. This position is firmly established and there can be little hope of change. These holdings result from the traditional ideas (1) that "title" is an ultimate fact in pleading, 97 and (2) that the adverse possessor for the statutory period has "title." 8 For many purposes, this manner of thinking and speaking is convenient but it must be remembered that the regarding of title as something real and a priori instead of a mere shorthand expression to denote a more or less definite number of legal relationships may lead to serious inaccuracie* or even absurdities. 9 There is also the more frequent situation in which a defendant claims title by adverse possession against the plaintiff, the original owner. Under the prevailing rule the defendant may raise the statute of limitations by any form of denial which puts the "title" in issue, 1 00 but some jurisdictions require the defendant to plead the statute specially.', There is still another group of cases in which the courts generally permit the question of limitation of time to be raised under a general denial. This is the class already noticed 2 in which the limitation is fixed by the same statutes which "created" the light, sometimes summarized as ones in which the limitation is said to bar the right as well as the remedy. 0 3 From the substantive law standpoint or, in other words, considering the operative facts as properly pleaded and shown, there seems to be no difference between the effect of the required lapse of time under the general statute of limitations and the special limitation provision of the statutory actions. In both cases the effect is to prevent the plaintiff's recovery. The principal differences are the procedural ones here in question, viz., as to the assertion of the point by demurrer or by general denial, and the matter of burden of proof. 04 To say that the limitations of the special statutory actions bar the right as well as the remedy is not a reason for the different procedural treatment but an avkward announcement of the position that a difference will be made. As has already been indicated, the writer has searched for a satisfactory reason for this distinction and has failed to find one. Yet for the most part the courts have not required the defense to be specially pleaded in these cases, 02 while they ordinarily require it with respect to the general statute of limitations.
to apply with reference to chattels. 94 Pac. 491 (1908) 2. By Confession and Avoidance. On the whole there is a tendency of recent legislation and case law to prevent the assertion of the defense of limitation of time at the trial under a general denial. There has been no pronounced rush in this direction, nor any sudden abandonment of former practices. But the current tends this way, largely because of our present emphasis upon the notice function of pleading. 1 00 The English rules of court were among the earliest influences in this regard. Rule 15 of Order XIX provides that matters which are likely to take the opposite party by surprise should be specially pleaded, and this general statement is followed by the enumeration of particular matters which should be alleged. Among these is the defense of the statute of limitations. The English provision is followed substantially in Connecticut, 0 " Michigan, o8 New Jersey, 1 0 9 and New York. 110 In addition, a number of code jurisdictions have statutes "I to the effect that the defense must be asserted by answer. Such legislative declarations have not caused the courts to depart entirely and suddenly from the "title by adverse possession" and the "right as well as remedy barred" grooves, in which a denial has traditionally raised the point." m Worshippers of the concept of title and of issue pleading will continue to tread the old paths. Those who insist that notice is the primary object of pleading will require special notice of the defense to be given. Decisions continue to follow the course of the old grooves but the foregoing provisions have already made some impression 13 and their future effect may be much greater.
The approved plea of the statute of limitations at common law was that "the cause of action did not accrue within x years before the commencement of this suit." 114 There might be said to appears on the face of the complaint, it should be raised by demurrer or is deemed waived and cannot be asserted by answer.' But in states which permit the demurrer to raise the point, an answer will usually be a sufficient means of making the objection, although the complaint is demurrable on that account., 8 " It might be plausible to hold that the defense should be disfavored to the extent that it must be asserted at the earliest opportunity or is deemed waived. At common law, certain defenses -pleas to the jurisdiction and in abatement -were disapproved to the extent that they must be pleaded before matters in bar. 137 However, the plea of limitations was considered to be in bar and in this respect was in as good favor as any defense which went to the merits. Under the present New York procedure, the defendant may raise the defense by answer, though he could have asserted it upon preliminary motion. 188 As a whole, we seem to be unwilling to require that the defendant assert the defense at the first possible point and in the most expeditious manner; we deem it sufficient if the defenses be raised in any approved manner at the pleading stage. While the courts often declare 1 9 that they do not disfavor the defense of the statute of limitations, they clearly do so to some extent. This is probably due in some measure to the prejudice against those who tacitly admit a once existing duty and defend on the ground that the duty has been extinguished by lapse of time. This-feeling cannot be overridden entirely by the felt and declared necessity of quieting stale claims. While the courts are bound by legislative provisions and have even imposed time limitation devices of their own manufacture, 1 40 they have the opportunity to give vent to their prejudice in decisions on procedural and other matters. Prejudice may well account for the prevailing view upon the matter of burden of proof 14l and for certain holdings 142 of procedural character. It is extremely dif- 240 The doctrine of laches, the presumption of payment, the presumption of grant, and the ancient limitations in the real actions and possessory assizes are examples of this.
141 See supra notes 9, 10. 142 There are several ways by which the courts might indicate their feeling of disapprobation of the defense of limitations in their procedural decisions.
(1) By insisting upon a particular time and device by which the mat-
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ficult if not impossible to present specific data as to the extent which this feeling has played in the decisions, but it is possible and indeed probable that the influence has been considerable. In addition to this factor, there are certain traits of the defense of the statute of limitations which may account for its apparent disfavor. While it would be possible to take the position that the bar is of such vital interest to society that the court will apply it of its own motion, this view has not prevailed.
1 4 3 A defendant may believe that his case is not harmed by passage of time and rely on some other defense, waiving the matter of time limitation. Once this position of non-assertion of the statute has been taken, there is much reason in refusing the defendant the advantage of the defense after he has consumed the time of the opponent and the court by the litigation of other matters.
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Moreover, the defense is one which almost always 145 acts as an absolute bar to any recovery and not merely in mitigation of damages.
In addition, a defendant seldom fails to plead the statute of limitations because of ignorance or mistake concerning the facts in the case -usually, it is an avoidable oversight on his part. For these reasons it seems undesirable to permit the defense to be raised by amendment at a late stage.1 45 The courts have been somewhat more strict with reference to amendments setting up the statute of limitations than in case of most other ter might be raised. See text supra at notes 135-138. (2) By requiring a particular form of words by which the matter might be raised. See mcpia notes 114-119. This method of disfavoring the defenses is purely formal and should not appeal to us today. (3) By holdings in which the defense when not pleaded is not considered for the purpose of granting motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, demurrer to evidence and in instructing the jury. See infr notes 155-158. (4) By the policy toward amendments. See infra notes 147-154; also Wise v. Outtrim, 139 Iowa, 192 W. 203 (1884) . But this gives only the slight pittance of taxable costs, which are entirely inadequate to compensate the opponent. The matter could be determined satisfactorily by the imposition of costs under the English practice where substantial and even actual costs are readily granted.
defenses.1 47 While they have been fairly liberal if the amendment is prayed for considerably before trial, 48 there is a different attitude shortly before, 4 9 at or after 160 trial. Of course if the defendant has been misled by the plaintiff's allegation of dates,' 1 5 or if both parties have tried the case as if the statute were pleaded,152 or if the statute is defectively set forth,U' and possibly under other circumstances," the amendment should be allowed even at a late stage.
The defense of the statute of limitations is somewhat peculiar in that the factual data necessary for its determination are almost inevitably injected into the case, although the statute is not pleaded or consciously raised at the trial. The dates of the transactions are almost certain to be specified by the witnesses and the date of commencement of the action regularly appears in the court records. No further facts are ordinarily necessary to decide the matter provided of course it is open without being asserted in the pleadings. With regard to most other matters of defense such as payment, self-defense, failure of consideration, etc., the data do not so inevitably and unconsciously creep into the case. Objections to the proof of these matters on the ground of failure to plead them can be easily made and sus-
